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In this work we analyzed the relationships between powerful politicians and businessmen of Chile
in order to study the phenomenon of social power. We developed our study according to Complex
Network Theory but also using traditional sociological theories of Power and Elites. Our analyses
suggest that the studied network displays common properties of Complex Networks, such as scal-
ing in connectivity distribution, properties of small-world networks, and modular structure, among
others. We also observed that social power (a proposed metric is presented in this work) is also
distributed inhomogeneously. However, the most interesting observation is that this inhomogeneous
power and connectivity distribution, among other observed properties, may be the result of a dy-
namic and unregulated process of network growth in which powerful people tend to link to similar
others. The compatibility between people, increasingly selective as the network grows, could gen-
erate the presence of extremely powerful people, but also a constant inequality of power where the
difference between the most powerful is the same as among the least powerful. Our results are also
in accordance with sociological theories.
keywords: Complex Networks, Social Networks, Model, Theory of Elites, Theory of Social Power.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps nothing in human history has been more se-
ductive than power and its relationships. It seems very
likely that its manifestation is parallel to the act of aban-
don the (primal) isolation and to form a society in or-
der to achieve, in common, its protection and survival.
The sociological literature is replete with the power phe-
nomenon, and it has been explained in many ways [38];
these explanations are based not so much on its ex-
plicit expression (imposition of will over another, or even
against its resistance [30, 65]), but rather on its rela-
tional character (i.e., there’s always someone who com-
mands and another who obeys) and very particularly on
the factors that make such interaction possible (both for
those who rule and those who obey).
The social sciences, and political sociology in particu-
lar, have paid attention to the study of power, particu-
larly on “what to do” once achieved, even, subordinating
what should be done once it has been achieved. This
comes from a long tradition first expressed in the second
century B.C. by Polybius [62] who prioritizes a pragmatic
sense of politics subordinating moral purpose. Niccolo`
Machiavelli, republished this position of decoupling poli-
tics from ethics thirteen centuries later [62]. Since then,
it has been power, and not the common good, which
has preferentially concerned the literature of the social
sciences. More recently, however, and perhaps in an at-
tempt to explain (and modify) society itself, other frame-
works, such as the Theory of Organizations and General
Systems Theory [9] have made contributions to the phe-
nomenon from a systemic point of view[66]. One exam-
ple of this kind of approach is the work done by Mark
Lombardi, an American artist and historian who stud-
ied social power, or more clearly its “uses and abuses”
[11]. He will be remembered not only due to his art but
for his bravery and for his work’s non-conventional way
of looking at the phenomenon. In Lombardi’s view, the
power of people cannot be understood by looking at in-
dividuals; rather, it is necessary to look at the system.
In fact, his work was immortalized in his graph drawings
called Narrative Structures, where people and organiza-
tions are linked by power relations. Today, this kind of
approach is common because social scientists recognize
the limitations of reductionism in addressing social prob-
lems. Notwithstanding these modern procedures, it was
in 18th century that E. Durkheim [19, 53] first opened the
door to understanding sociological phenomena from this
perspective. He talked about a concept called “dynamic
density” in order to explain the transition of an organic
society to a mechanical one. This change is produced
by a significant increase in the number of actors of the
system and simultaneously, the number of interactions
between them. Nowadays, this is known as a fundamen-
tal characteristic of Complex Systems and the evidence
that this kind of social complex structures display collec-
tive behaviors that are not described in the actors, makes
it necessary its study from an holistic perspective, since
it is the web of relationships who “hides” the information
about the system’s properties [7, 15, 61]. This coincides
with the ideas of Michel Foucault [23] on social power:
“Power must be analyzed as something which circulates,
or rather as something that operates in chain. It is never
localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some-
one, it is not an attribute such as wealth or goods. The
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2power functions... and is exercised through networks...”.
In 2012 a Chilean website, called Poderopedia, was
founded on the same spirit of Lombardi‘s work. Sup-
ported by a 16-month News Challenge Grant provided
by the Knight Foundation[67], and later with the help of
Start-Up Chile[68] and new funds provided by the Knight
Fellows Program of the International Center for Journal-
ists (ICFJ)[69], Poderopedia has developed a huge pub-
lic data base with (public) information about relations
between powerful businessmen, politicians and organiza-
tions/companies in Chile with the aim of providing pub-
lic transparency as a project embedded in what appears
to be a global need. In fact, Poderopedia’s spirit seems
to capture a concern of much of the world’s population
and recently the website is already operating in Colombia
and Venezuela. However, the data collected by Podero-
pedia are also interesting from a scientific point of view,
not only because of the amount (and dynamics) of the
data, but also due to its richness, which might contains
(hide) information about the power phenomenon. Pre-
cisely that motivated this work. Using the data from
Poderopedia, we studied the social network of Chilean
powerful people; this was not with the aim of detecting
or reporting the powerful, but rather to map social power
in Chile, characterizing it according to the links that de-
fine the relation among people, and trying to explain the
origin of its structure.
Considering the huge number of people and organiza-
tions/companies intricately connected, it was necessary
to approach the problem using tools from Complex Sys-
tems Theory while also relying on the sociological theory
of Power and Elites. This effort was based on the evi-
dence that certain features of complex systems are ideal
in understanding and explaining certain social processes
more comprehensively. What is surprising is that using
a novel approach to the social power phenomenon, we
found a principle of causal interpretation derived from
Complex Network theory. This principle was contrasted
with the major political underpinnings, discovering, in
this kind of “assisted reproduction” among disciplines,
surprising consequences. Our work puts in evidence that
the power phenomenon differs little from other collec-
tive behaviors of completely different nature. In fact, the
complexity of the power system seems to converges to a
universal architecture that depends on the system inter-
actions rather than psycho-social or even moral factors
affecting the political and business world.
The work is structured as follows: in the next section,
the methodology used by Poderopedia to complete its
relational data is presented and, in the same section, we
also show how we process the data provided in order to
obtain graphs of entities which map the structures of the
social power network of Chile; section 3 introduces the
social network model that we propose in order to explain
the structure observed in the real network from section
2; in Section 4, we present a sociological interpretation
of the results obtained in the previous sections; and, in
the last section, we discuss the major implications of the
obtained results and present the conclusions of our work.
II. CHILEAN SOCIAL POWER NETWORK:
CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS
Poderopedia is a collaborative data journalism plat-
form (poderopedia.org) that maps the “who’s who in
business and politics in Chile”. It is developed by jour-
nalists, programmers, designers, and independent collab-
orators who investigate, extract, select, and validate in-
formation from public sources, such as media, govern-
ment databases, business databases, and websites. This
information is subjected to careful source verification
processes and the most relevant aspects of public interest
are stored and published.
Poderopedia was designed to be used as a tool in the
day-to-day of journalists, media, general public, profes-
sionals, organizations, and companies who need to find
information about the relations between powerful people
and organizations in Chile. It also seeks to promote cit-
izen participation by giving users the option to register
on the website to provide all kinds of data.
The data collected are stored according to the on-
tology called PoderVocabulary (https://github.com/
poderopedia/podervocabulary), specially designed for
this purpose. PoderVocabulary is based on OWL (Web
Ontology Language), Friend-of-a-friend (FOAF) and
BIO, an extension of FOAF, focused on biographical in-
formation. Data stored can be accessed by users who
want to search for specific entities’ properties as well as
their relations. Users registered in Poderopedia can also
suggest new entity relationships.
Entities in the Poderopedia ontology can be of two
types: Persons and Organizations/Companies; each
is characterized by a set of attributes that describe
their properties. Furthermore, relations between enti-
ties are also of different kinds: Person-Person, Person-
Organization, and Organization-Organization. A sub set
of connection types are defined inside of each link cate-
gory (Table I).
Table I: Types of relationships used by Poderopedia to link
entities.
Relation category Relation type
Person-Person family, friend, close, known, classmate
Person-Organization position in company, participation in
company,
position in NGO, participation in NGO,
participation in economic group,
position in International organism,
public office, study, religious group,
support groups for political campaign,
social movement, private club,
political party, think tanks or study
center
Organization-Organization commercial, dependence, donations,
property, grants
We worked with data stored in Poderopedia servers
between June 2012 and March 11th, 2014. The reason is
that day the change of government took place in Chile.
Michelle Bachelet began her second period as President
3and Sebastia´n Pin˜era finished his one. Any data collected
after that date might have created noise in our analysis
due to the entry of many new entities and retalionships
(associated with the new government) to the system.
Our analysis was initially focused on person to per-
son relations. For this reason, we projected the original
network onto a unimodal structure. Since the original
network of Poderopedia is not a real bipartite graph[70],
the projection made is not one typically used in the case
of bipartite networks; that is, there are links between
entities of the same type. Thus, if two persons are con-
nected by an organization/company in the original net-
work, they would be connected in the projected network.
However, if two persons are connected by a path com-
posed of two adjacent organizations/companies, they are
not connected (through this path) in our projected net-
work.
Figure 1: Network of Chilean Power. The network rep-
resents the projected network of 3140 people and 17353
edges. The layout, obtained using the OpenOrd al-
gorithm (https://github.com/gephi/gephi-plugins/tree/
openord-layout), shows the powerful people (see definition
below) bigger than the rest and colored by community parti-
tion using the Blondel et al. algorithm [14].
Figure 1 shows the projected people network. This net-
work is composed of N=3140 people and E=17353 edges
between them. The figure also shows nodes and links
colored according to the community partition detected
using the algorithm proposed by Blondel et al. [14]. Al-
though we treat the networks as undirected, the color of
links represents the community color of the source node
according to the relational data used.
We were interested in the projected people network
because we needed to know what was the most powerful
people of the network, and then analyzed their relation-
ships as cases of study. Although the social power in this
network could be rudimentarily defined as the number of
incoming and outgoing links, we wanted to find a more
sophisticated metric. For this reason we implemented a
metric of social power, P , that considers the quality of
links of the person (Page Rank [48]), the cohesiveness of
the immediate neighborhood (clustering coefficient, ci),
the capacity of the person to connect people (between-
ness coefficient, bi) and the proportion of person’s links
that represent family, business, religious or political re-
lations. The sizes of the nodes in the network of Fig. 1
represent corresponding P values.
The community analysis shows that there are three
communities bigger than the rest, comprising 51.6% of
the nodes and 74.8% of the links (red, blue and green
communities in Fig. 1). A detail of the connections
within this densely connected structure is shown in Fig-
ure 2. These three communities contain the set of people
and relationships used for analysis in the following sec-
tions. Before that, however, let us now delve into some
topological particularities of this network which are sim-
ilar to those observed in other complex networks.
Figure 2: The three major communities of the network of
Chilean power. Color and node size as in Fig. 1.
A wide range of real complex systems have been stud-
ied from the perspective of Complex Network Theory.
This theory provides a framework for describing inter-
actions in a system from a purely topological point of
view and allows us to abstract away dynamic processes
that use such a structure as a substrate [43]. A com-
mon and non-trivial topology was observed in most of
the systems studied [20, 46]. In particular, the topology
found in these complex networks was characterized by
the presence of scaling in the node connectivity distribu-
tion. This phenomenon denotes high inhomogeneity in
connectivity, which is where the term scale-free network
comes from [8]; this is unlike the connectivity observed in
networks where connections are randomly assigned. Such
4inhomogeneity stems from the non-negligible presence of
densely connected nodes (hubs) in these networks. Be-
sides inhomogeneity, complex topologies share character-
istic properties of small-world networks [64], i.e., they are
associated with low distances between randomly chosen
pairs of nodes and having a high clustering coefficient.
The scale-free character and properties of small-world
networks seem to be a finger print of so-called complex
networks [46, 59].
P(k) ~ k −1.527, R2=0.7974
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Figure 3: Node degree distribution, P (k), for the real network
and for its randomized version (bottom inset). Upper inset
shows the mean clustering Cˆ and average path length lˆ of the
real network (red) and its randomized version (purple).
Using the Python powerlaw package [3], we determined
the function that best fits the connectivity distribution of
our people network. The results show that the power law
function is the best candidate, specifically, a truncated
power law[71] in comparison with normal, log-normal or
exponential functions. This means that the people net-
work displays the same scale-free character that many
other complex systems share, wherein the probability of
choosing a person with k connections scales (negatively)
with the degree k. As can be seen in Fig. 3, close to
50% of the nodes are poorly connected (k ≤ 3) but a
few have many connections. This scenario, for a net-
work of the same size and same number of links but with
random connections, is totally different (Fig. 3 (bot-
tom inside plot)). In the “random” scenario (not a real
classical random graph [22] because the existing edges
were randomly redirected), more than 80% of the people
have a connectivity close to the mean, between 30 and
40 links, and connectivities far from this magnitude are
practically impossible (the probability decays following
an exponential function). This means that the proba-
bility of finding a person with a connectivity higher (or
less) than the mean decays quickly in comparison with
the scaling observed in the original network. In the real
scenario the “speed” of probability decrease remain con-
stant, that is, the inequality between densely connected
people is comparable to the one observed between the
poorly connected people.
Furthermore, we found that a short distance between
randomly chosen pairs of persons coexists with a high
transitivity of connectivity, as in small-world networks
[64]. The upper inset of Figure 3 shows how transitivity
is lost in a random scenario: the high transitivity of con-
nection in the social network (Cˆ=0.62) practically goes
to 0 when links are randomly distributed between people.
By contrast, the average path length, lˆ, remains practi-
cally unaltered, suggesting that the well known small-
world effect, associated with a short average path length,
is not only a property of complex graphs, but also of
those with random connections [22].
III. MODELING THE SOCIAL POWER
NETWORK
Since the social network of powerful Chileans shows
properties reminiscent of complex systems, it follows that
one should want to know the reason, or at least the mech-
anism. In this respect, we compared different dynamic
complex networks models that have been proposed in re-
cent years [20] . One of them, the well-known Preferen-
tial Attachment model, or Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model
[8], have been the most popular. The model considers a
social-like rule, where “the rich get richer”, as the rule
that governs the growth of the network. In this model,
a new node added to the system is linked preferentially
to the most connected nodes. The mechanism appears
to apply in the same way for the power network. Indeed,
this is intuitively how we as non-powerful people think:
power attracts more power.
However, this study has a different hypothesis. Ac-
cording to studies concerning Elites and Power in soci-
ety, “a man (belonging to the Elite) is shaped by his
relations with others like him...” [37], “(Elites) develop a
common language and generate meeting spaces” [50] and
“not enough that each elite has its own communication
mechanisms, but it needed to be building a common im-
age of society” [50]. In summary, it appears that the re-
lationships between powerful people necessarily depends
on their sharing certain characteristics. In fact, G. Tarde
[47] talks about the phenomenon of imitation, common
among powerful people. Considering this, the Compati-
bility Attachment Model (CAM) [16] seems to be a good
candidate.
In CAM, a (complex) network arises from compatibil-
ity, a simple local mechanism so called due to the fact
that the relationship of two system entities is a prod-
uct of the compatibility between their characters. For
the purposes of this study, compatibility would be this
common language, view of society, etc., common among
powerful persons.
5In this model the compatibility among nodes depends
on the system size according to the compatibility thresh-
old, Ci, given by,
Ci =
d
τ
, (1)
where d is a constant called compatibility distance be-
tween node characters, which is determined by a certain
probability density function; and τ represents the size
N of the system at that moment. The dependence of τ
makes the probability of linking remains constant over
time. This means that, as more nodes appear in the net-
work, the new ones arrived to the system should be more
like to the oldest nodes to which the link occurs. This
perspective has major implications, which will be seen in
the last section of this work.
Figure 4 shows the degree distribution, P (k), observed
both in the real power network and in the two models
previously described, BA model and CAM. As can be
seen, both models generate a network with heterogeneous
connectivity, with many poorly-connected nodes and few
hubs. However, the CAM more accurately reproduces
the real connectivity distribution. The BA model gives
poorly connected people a higher probability in compari-
son with the real network; moreover, the scaling exponent
is stronger, which denotes less connectivity heterogeneity
with respect to the real network. The inset of Figure 4
shows the high correlation of finding people with k con-
nections in the real and CAM networks.
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Figure 4: Node degree distribution, P (k), for the real network
(red stars) and two stochastic models: CAM (purple dots) and
BA model (grey squares). Bottom inset shows the correlation
between P (k) of real network and those generated by the
CAM.
CAM not only closely reproduces the connectivity dis-
tribution, it also reproduces the high transitivity of con-
nections Cˆ and the mean connectivity kˆ better than the
BA model (Table II). The BA model does have a fairly
faithful reproduction of the average shortest path length
lˆ, whereas CAM overestimates this metric.
Table II: Models comparison. Number of nodes, links, scaling
exponent γ, transitivity of connections Cˆ, average shortest
path length lˆ, mean connectivity kˆ, percentage of nodes that
compose the giant component GC and the degree assortativ-
ity r, for the real network and two stochastic models: CAM
and BA model.
Network Links γ Cˆ lˆ kˆ GC (%) r
Real 17353 -1.5 0.622 3.69 17.0 60.0 0.38
CAM 13741.4 ± 593 -1.6 0.596 ± 0.005 7.65 ± 0.34 8.8 ± 0.4 60.6 ± 2.4 0.88 ± 0.01
BA 9411.0 ± 0 -2.0 0.013 ± 0.001 3.88 ± 0.007 5.0 ± 0 - ∼0.0 [45]
Another interesting aspect of the CAM is that it is
capable of generating a graph with a giant component,
as occurs in the real network where the entire graph is
composed by isolated subgraphs and one giant network
that groups over 60% of the people. In the BA model the
resulting network graph has a unique connected compo-
nent. Moreover, the CAM can reproduce the assortativ-
ity [45] (k-correlation) observed in the real network. The
last was expected in the CAM because the compatibil-
ity mechanism generates a homophilic network, however,
the observed homophily in the real network is not triv-
ial. Highly connected people in the power network are
preferably linked together, while those with few connec-
tions are linked with others with few connections.
It is interesting to note what happened with the at-
tribute of social power P . Well, the assortativity per per-
son attribute (pi) is also positive rp=0.11, which means
that powerful people (according to our definition) tend
also to connect to powerful people and people with low
power are linked to less powerful people.
Due to the fact that, according to the Poderopedia
power connection data, power P seems to be strongly
correlated with node degree, it is not surprising that the
distribution of P also follows a power law with an ex-
ponent similar to the P (k) distribution (Fig. 5). Using
the same fit test as of section II, we can observe that the
power P also scales giving to 1% of the population of
the network (31 people) 31.7% of the total P power[72].
Approximately 2% of the population has a half of power
of the system. Notice that the most powerful quartile is
composed of only 2 people, a clear social power concen-
tration.
In order to explore the connections between power-
ful people, and to validate the compatibility attachment
model in this context, we use the distribution of power P
to establish a “nucleus of power”, defined as the top 20
politicians and businessmen to respective positions in the
P rank (40 people = 1.2% of the population). Using the
information of each entity stored in Poderopedia data,
we selected only people that have an exclusively politi-
cal or busisness “career”. However, it is necessary to say
that in spite of the result that shows an inhomogeneous
distribution of P , the concept of “nucleus of power” it is
not totally correct; this is because there are many nuclei
6People ~ P −1.511, R2=0.8864
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Figure 5: Number of people having social power P in the
network. The power was normalized and divided in quartiles
(Q).
at different scales, a Polyarchy according to R. Dahl [17].
However, we will use this concept throughout the work
to refer to the group of most powerful people.
The same meaning of “nucleus of power” was used by
W. Mills [37] to refers to the most powerful people in
the United States. Mills understood that it is not merit
which determines the possibility of belonging and inclu-
sion, but rather trust, a subjective factor that is related
to the attitude of commitment to the defense of that
position of power. It’s what Michels understood as the
“iron law of oligarchy” [36]. The nucleus of power, in
our view, is pierced by these kinds of attitudes, which
represent identity links, commitments supporting domain
positioning, and optimal gratification involving rewards.
The remarkable thing about this is that this phenomenon
explained by political sociology can be observed in our
analysis.
It is not surprising that these forty people are located
in the three principal communities. However, their dis-
tribution on these modules is different. For example,
top businessmen belong to the red and blue communities
(50% each one), while 65% of the top politicians belongs
to the green community, 25% to the red, and the rest to
the blue. Figure 6 show the same representation of the
network of Figure 2 but with communities collapsed into
macro nodes labeled according to their principal type of
top entities. It can be observed that the red community
contains not only 50% of the top businessmen and 25%
of the top politicians, but also the most powerful people
(the size of the (macro) node represents the amount of
power P contained in it).
Figure 6: Network of Chilean Power. Layout as Fig. 1 with
people of the same community “collapsed” into a macro-node
labeled according the most representative people group de-
tected. Size of the node represents the amount of social power
P contained.
IV. AN INTERPRETATION FROM
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF POWER AND
ELITES
Sometimes it seems more interesting to ask why a per-
son obeys another, rather than trying to explain how
someone has power over another. Political sociology as-
sumes this question with the understanding that, in this
relationship, the search for “prompt and sincere” obedi-
ence seems to be essential [65]. Therein lies legitimacy, a
dimension shared by all political action.
Max Weber and his followers (including theorists who
studied Elites, such as G. Mosca, W. Pareto, W. Mills
and R. Michels) have built a vast analytical interpreta-
tion, which we delve into below (for details of source
theory, see Table III). Classification of power and the
phenomenological categories explaining it are a power-
ful analytical tool box that we have applied in an initial
attempt to understand exactly what is involved in the
interpretation of the connections between powerful peo-
ple in Chile. These include the factors of domination
adduced by G. Mosca (organizational skills and capac-
ity to create political formula); the laws from R. Michels
(specialization law, law of psychological metamorphosis
of the leader and the iron law of oligarchy), on which
7positivism is based; the psychological residues left by W.
Pareto, which defines permanence, combination, and the
recurring phenomenon of the circulation of elites; and
the analysis of the nucleus of power, by W. Mills.
Table III: Conceptual categories of Power and Elites used in
this work. Principal referent for each category and typologies
associated.
Categories Author Typologies
Power M. Weaver [6, 13, 55, 65] Economic, Coercive,
Ideologic
Legitimate Domination M. Weaver [6, 13, 55, 65] Charismatic, Traditional,
Racional Legal
Nucleus of Power W. Mills [37] Economic, Military,
Politic
Objects of Situation T. Parsons [55, 58] Expected Roles, Internal-
ized values, Recognition of
affection
Domination Factors G. Mosca [39, 40] Capacity to organize, Ca-
pacity to create political
formula
Law of Oligarchy R. Michels [36] Law of specialization, Law
of psychological metamor-
phosis of the leader, Iron
Law of Oligarchy
Psychological residues of
Elites
W. Pareto [2, 33, 49] Persistence residues,
Residues of combination
Interests of Domination R. Dahrendorf [54] Latent interests, Manifests
interest
Pluralistic Society W. Kornhauser [28] Accessibility of elites,
Availability of non-elites
According to the CAM, the power network of Chile
can be interpreted as the result of a dynamic popula-
tion growth process where relationships between people
depend on the compatibility between their personal char-
acteristics. In fact, looking at professional training and
age characteristics within the “nucleus of power”, we ob-
served that a group with homogeneous attributes exists.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of professional training
in the nucleus, where 70% of the people are lawyers,
economists or engineers, with an average age of 60.7 ±
9.6 years. However, as we might intuit, not all 65 year
old Chilean lawyers are powerful. Deeper reasons must
exist to explain this phenomenon.
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3%	   other	  
13%	  
Figure 7: Distribution of professional training in the nucleus
of power.
Despite professional training and age supporting the
proposed compatibility thesis, it was still possible that
implicit, underlying causes from Poderopedia’s infras-
tructure could have a measurable effect on relationship
analysis (see Table I). In order to search for these causes,
we explored paired connections of nucleus nodes. In this
way we were able to circumvent one of the major weak-
ness of modern sociological theory, which does not con-
vincingly marry interactions at the micro level with those
of the macro-level [25].
As many possibles paths exist between politicians and
businessmen nodes in the nucleus, we analyzed the short-
est paths, which are more robust for detecting the if a
common view of society is held by both entities. The
inverse of this reinforces this choice; indeed Harary et al.
[26] noted that there may be a distance beyond which
it is not feasible for a person to communicate with an-
other because of the costs and distortions associated with
the act of transmission. It is important to mention that
our analysis makes use of the original Poderopedia graph
(i.e., before projection) since not only was the detail of
personal relationships need, but also the relations be-
tween people and organizations.
The (shortest) path that connects two people was char-
acterized by all the relation types and their path fre-
quency. Including all the possible paths computed, we
obtained a link type probability vector. Since there were
two link types considered [person ↔ person] and [person
↔ organization], the vector was divided in both cate-
gories. Figure 8 shows both vectors represented as bar
charts where the height indicates the link type probabil-
ity.
rea l
random sampling
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
0 .1
0 .2
0 .3
0 .4
0 .5
0 .6
Known
Friends
Classmates
Husband/W ife
Fam ily
Close
real
random sampling
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Position in Int. org.
Political party
Think Tanks-Study C.
Studies
Public position
NGO position
Investment in company
Position in company
Religious group
Support political campaign
Social movements
Participation econ. groups
NGO participation
Figure 8: Frequency of links types detected in the paths com-
puted for the nucleus of power. Person to Person (left) and
Person to Organization/Companies (right).
As can be seen, 80% of the relations, or social actions,
in the nucleus of power are between close friends and
family, followed by friends, in [person ↔ person] rela-
tions. No significant difference can be observed with the
paths computed for random sampling of those outside
the top businessmen and politicians.
On the other hand, considering [person ↔ organiza-
tion] actions, over 50% of the relations inside the nucleus
of power are between those belonging to the same politi-
cal party, same place of study, or having a position in the
same company. For random paths, the study site loses
importance in favor of political party relations.
What we understand as relations or social actions, is
entirely related to the motivations that make it possible
for someone to be linked to another, and any conditions
that favor this link, including the intersubjective and ho-
8mogeneous construction of “world” that actors perform
(shared codes). This is in agreement with rational moti-
vators, related both to interests and values, as well as to
traditions and affections. This traditional classification
given by M. Weber [57] was gathered and expanded upon
by T. Parsons[51, 55]. In order to give content to what
happens along the paths that connect people, we derived
attitudes, expectations and behaviors associated with this
typology of social action from the computation of paths
between powerful people.
Table IV shows the interpretation that we used for
Poderopedia link types as according to theories of We-
ber and Parsons [51, 55]. The relationships contained in
the Poderopedia data set represents the Situation of ac-
tion, according to Parsons, and reflects the scenario faced
by an actor. This scenario can be evaluated according
to the orientation modes that actors take, which can be
cognitive, valorative, or affective, in what Parsons calls
“motivational orientation” [55, 58]. For cognitive ori-
entation, we used the Expected Roles; in the valorative
orientation, the Internalized Values; and in the affective
orientation, the Recognition of Affections as Objects of
Situation. Thus, our interpretation sees the actors as
evaluating their actions according to a rational analysis
(cost / benefit); an valorative analysis, in order to esti-
mate the consequences and effects of their action from the
perspective of their moral responsibility; and finally, an
affective analysis, in order to estimate the emotional sat-
isfaction that the object will produce (desired). Through
case studies of the subjects, we emphasize the manifest
or latent character of each of these Objects of Situation.
Table IV: Motivational Orientation associated to Poderope-
dia link types. Manifest (M) and Latent (L). [Source: own
elaboration].
Motivational
orientation
Cognitive
orientation
Value orientation Affective
orientation
Need Dispositions
Situation Expected Roles Internalized Values Recognition of
Affections
[person ↔
person]
Known •(L) •(M)
Friends •(L) •(M)
Classmate •(L) •(M)
Husband/Wife •(L) •(M)
Family •(L) •(M)
Close •(L) •(M)
[person ↔
organization]
Position in Interna-
tional organisms
•(M) •(L)
Political party •(L) •(M)
Think Tanks and
Study Centers
•(L) •(M)
Studies •(M) •(L)
Public position •(M) •(L)
NGO position •(M) •(L)
Investment in
company
•(M) •(L)
Position in
company
•(M) •(L)
Religious group •(L) •(M)
Support groups to
political campaigns
•(L) •(M)
Social movements •(M) •(L)
Participation in
economic groups
•(M) •(L)
NGO participation •(M) •(L)
In addition, and given the interpretation framework,
paths connecting two people contain information about
symbols and meanings. People act on the objects of their
world and interact with others utilizing the subjective
meanings that objects and people have, that is, from
“symbols”. In turn, “meanings” are the product of so-
cial interaction, mainly communication. Communication
then becomes essential in the constitution of both the
person and in the social production of meaning.
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Figure 9: Path between entities i and j. Length and ampli-
tude defined.
A relevant point from sociology highlights that inter-
action (social action) is only possible when actors uni-
formly understand the senses and meanings, codes and
symbols, of either party involved in the relation. This
point is also key to understanding the phenomenon that
supports the construction of a “nucleus of power”. As
discussed throughout, the “powerful” tend to be linked
with themselves, which does not solely happen by a factor
of domination but rather by one of likeness [37].
Figure 9 shows an example of a proposed method in-
cluding the interpretation rules discussed above. In this
example, entity i and j are separated by l entities de-
noting the length of the path. Here, we identify another
property of the path: its amplitude. Path amplitude is
defined as the frequency of the (for example) the three
motivational orientations: Expected Roles, Internalized
Values, and Affect Recognition, along the shortest path
between two entities according to Table IV.
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Figure 10: Keys of compatibility: Manifest Motivational Ori-
entation (left) and Latent Motivational Orientation (right).
According to Table IV. Nucleus of power (green) and
3 random measures (purple). E.R.= Expected Roles,
I.V.=Internalized Values, R.A.=Recognition of Affections.
This amplitude can be interpreted as a “key” or “code”
that allows two entities to belong to the nucleus, or sim-
ply be linked to another. In simple words, the “key of
compatibility” is the deeper compatibility between peo-
ple that we found.
9Figure 10 shows the “key of compatibility” for nucleus
members. The result suggests that the links between
powerful people obey their Expected Roles and Internal-
ized Values to a similar magnitude. Affect Recognition
seems to be less important. No difference was observed
between nucleus relation and random relations, suggest-
ing a robust result. However, the analysis of latent moti-
vations shows that Internalized Values have a “starring”
role followed by Expected Roles. The recognition of af-
fect also seems to be the less important.
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Figure 11: Keys of compatibility: Optimum of Gratification
(left) and Resulting Basic Action Types (right). According
to Table V. Nucleus of power (green) and 3 random measures
(purple).
The previous results can be further reinforced by tak-
ing the theory of Optimal Gratification into considera-
tion, that is, by adding the analysis of vested interests
of actors and behaviors associated with the social action
(Table V). In terms of motivation, the ultimate interest of
any actor is to obtain the “Optimum of Gratification” as
the best that can be obtained from the conditions given
the set of existential needs and the set of possibilities.
Thus, in order to designate the interests embodied in the
Objects of Situation, Parsons [55, 58] used the same as
those of vested interests. These interests are related to
“Power” and “Domination”. Additionally, there are re-
sulting behaviors linked to each one of the Objects of Sit-
uation of Table IV (cognitive/Intellectual-Instrumental;
Valorative/Responsible; Affective/Expressive). Figure
11 shows others “keys of compatibility” for the nucleus
of power.
As can be seen in the left “key of compatibility” of Fig-
ure 11, actions of powerful people are related to expected
“Power” and “Domination”, both in a similar magni-
tude. Among the randomly sampled (less-powerful peo-
ple) gratification seems to be related to power more than
domination. With respect to the behaviors derived from
the Situation of action (right “key of compatibility”), the
results suggest that most of the resulting behaviors are
“Expressive” and “Instrumental”, followed by “Respon-
sible”, and much further along, “Intellectual”. A similar
pattern is seen in the random sampling of less-powerful
persons.
Table V: Optimum of Gratification and Resulting Basic Ac-
tion Types associated to Poderopedia link types. [Source:
own elaboration].
Optimus of gratification Resulting Basic Action Types
Vested Interests Behavior
Need Dispositions
Situation Power Domination Intelectual Expressive ResponsibleInstrumental
Known,
Friends,
Class-
mate,
Hus-
band/Wife,
Family,
Close
• •
Position
in Inter-
national
organ-
isms,
Political
Party,
Think
Tanks
and Study
Centers
• •
Studies • •
Public
position
• • •
NGO po-
sition or
participation
• •
Investment
or posi-
tion in
company,
Support
groups to
political
campaigns
• •
Religious
groups
• •
Social
Movements
• • •
Participation
in eco-
nomic
groups
• •
A. Businessmen vs Politicians
According to [50], power in Chile is concentrated in two
areas: business and politics. In contrast, symbolic and
social power represent less than 30%. In order to explore
the relations inside the two main groups and to search
for the same signals of relation detailed in the previous
section, we analyzed the shortest paths between busi-
nessmen and politicians. Figure 12 shows the vector of
probability for link types that describe the relationships
between top people in both groups.
As can be observed, for [person ↔ person] context,
the social actions between businessmen are characterized
by close and familiar relations. However, for the case of
politicians, most of the relations are between close peo-
ple, while family or friend relations are infrequent. In the
random politician paths, interestingly, we observed that
family ties seem to play a much more important role, de-
noting that these kind of links are less frequent between
politicians within the nucleus.
The [person↔ organization] context yielded somewhat
expected results. The most probable relation type for
businessmen is their participation in a company, while
for politicians, belonging to a political party seems to be
the most probable, especially in random paths. However,
this context exposes something else, namely, that paths
for businessmen are more diverse than politician paths.
All the detected (social) actions give us the “keys of
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Figure 12: Businessmen relations: Person to Person (left top)
and Person to Organization (right top). Politicians relations:
Person to Person (left bottom) and Person to Organization
(right Bottom). Frequency of links detected in the paths com-
puted. Businessmen (red), politicians (cyan) and 3 random
sampling (purple).
compatibility” associated with Motivational Orientation,
Optimum of Gratification and Resulting Basic Action for
politicians and businessmen (Fig. 13).
Table VI: Conducts and effects of politicians and business-
men associated with their objects of situation (left part of the
table). Capacity of politicians and businessmen for organiza-
tion and to create political formula as Domination Factors. *
I=Intellective, R= Responsible, E=Expressive. ** P=Power,
D=Domination, R= Responsible. [Source: own elaboration].
ENTITY DOMINATION FACTORS
POLITICIAN/BUSINESSMEN POLITICIAN/BUSINESSMEN
Need
Dispositions
Conduct* Effect** Capacity of
organization
Capacity to
create political
formula
Roles
expectatives
I / I P / P high / high high / low
Internalized
values
R / R D / R low / low high / low
Recognition of
affect
E / E D / D low / high high / low
A clear difference between groups can be observed. In
businessmen (Fig. 13, top row, left) relations depends
on Expected Roles, while those that depend on Internal-
ized Values and Recognition of Affect are less frequent.
This result is quite different than the observed behavior
between politicians (Fig. 13, top row, right) where Inter-
nalized Values seems to dominate the relations inside the
group. With respect to the expected gratification return,
businessmen and politicians in the nucleus of power seem
to act in search of domination and power; however, in the
random samples, politicians seem more likely to look for
power. Finally, with respect to the types of Resulting Ba-
sic Action, the analysis shows that businessmen (bottom
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Figure 13: Keys of compatibility: Motivational Orientation
(Top), Optimum of Gratification (mid) and Resulting Basic
Action Types (bottom) for businessmen (left, red) and politi-
cians (right, blue) in comparison with 3 random measures
(purple). According to Tables IV and V. E.R.=Expected
Roles, I.V.=Internalized Values, R.A.=Recognition of Affec-
tions.
row, left) have Instrumental behaviors, followed by Ex-
pressive and Intellectual. On the other hand, the behav-
iors of politicians (bottom row, right) are preferentially
Expressive or Responsible. In most of the cases, ran-
dom samples show similar behaviors respective to their
corresponding real data, denoting again, robust results.
Although the keys herein presented already provide
valuable insight, it is possible to go deeper in these re-
sults because, according to sociological theory, there are
conducts and effects (results) associated to Objects of Sit-
uation (Table VI, left column). For the two most repre-
sentatives motivational orientations of both groups, Ex-
pected Roles and Internalized Values (see Fig. 13, top
row), there are Intellective and Responsible conducts as-
sociated [58]. Power is the effect associated with the Ex-
pected Roles for both groups, however, a key difference
appears in the effect of Internalized Values: for politi-
cians, it is the Domination, but for businessmen, it is
Responsibility.
Furthermore, there are Domination Factors [39, 40]
(Table VI, right column) such as “capacity of organiza-
tion” and “capacity to create political formula” associ-
ated to conducts and object. The theory summarized in
the table supposes that the difference between politicians
and businessmen is in their ability to create political for-
11
random sample
nucleus of power
l i
0
2
4
c i
0
0.5
# 
HT
M
L d
oc
um
en
ts
0
2000
Politicians Businessmen
Figure 14: Politicians vs businessmen. Average shortest path
length lˆi from entity i to the rest (bottom), average cluster-
ing coefficient of entity i (mid) and average number of HTML
documents of entity i “saying something” (top), in compari-
son with 3 random samples (purple bars).
mula. In order to test this, we used the generated topo-
logical entity information as an approximation of their
capacity of organization. Thus, we say that this capac-
ity is related with the “size” of their “world”. If their
“world” (nearby people) is small, we say the people have
a high capacity of organization. According to this defini-
tion we use two classic metrics to gauge this “world size”:
the mean cohesiveness of their neighborhood (cˆi), and the
average length of the shortest connections between them
(lˆi). As the bottom and middle plots in Figure 14 show,
both groups have relatively the “same capacity”.
Figure 15: Three major communities of Chilean power net-
work. Layout shows the powerful in the center. The nu-
cleus of power (40 people) is colored according the profile of
the person: businessmen (red), liberal politician (yellow) and
conservative politician (blue).
Since these results were so similar, another approach
was needed to observe differences in the capacity to create
political formula. In order to measure this difference,
the number of HTML documents that contains words
such as “say”, “explain”, among others, associated to
the person were used as indicator, and as a primary and
very basic attempt to approach the problem. We worked
under the assumption that phrases such as “He said...”
or “She explained...” denotes construction of language
that can lead to “essay building” which may mean to
reach a consensus [27, 52] in the population or to build
legitimacy [65]. As Figure 14 (top plot) shows, politicians
are much more prolific than businessmen in this respect.
Finally, we connected the profile of persons with so-
cial power P defined in the previous section. In order
to obtain clear results, we divided the politician group
in two: liberals and conservatives. Figure 15 shows the
positions of top businessmen (red) and top politicians
(blue=conservatives, yellow=liberals) in the three com-
munities described in Section II. The layout of the figure
shows that the less powerful people “orbit” the core of
power. As can be seen, a high proportion of links of
conservatives politicians and businessmen go to the pe-
riphery, but most of the links of liberals seem to be inside
this core.
Figure 16: Nucleus of power isolated and sorted (in the clock-
wise direction) according to their P power. Color nodes as in
Fig. 15.
Once these people were isolated from the core and
sorted, clockwise, according to their P power (Fig. 16),
we can observe that Chilean businessmen are clearly less
powerful than politicians, especially conservatives.
12
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSSIONS
The results of the previous sections open the discus-
sion about the validity of the original claim of sociology,
that of explaining social facts, which assumes a mislead-
ing perception that it is possible to differentiate the di-
mensions of subject and object and thus to accentuate
the “objectivity” in the same way as natural sciences do.
That’s what Durkheim [5, 21, 32, 42] and other founders
of the Social Sciences believed. However, to continue to
support this separation is difficult because those things
that we objectify (social facts) end up being social con-
structs inseparable from their attributed meanings (in-
terpretive values), which in turn allows for (undue) in-
terference stemming from subjectivity (i.e., the subject).
The epistemological consequences are varied, and in part,
we try to mediate these phenomena in this study. That
said, and through this novel epistemological approach to
the phenomenon of power, here are some discussions and
conclusions about the results.
The social network of powerful Chilean people shows
non-trivial and non-intuitive statistical properties, com-
monly observed in complex systems. The most remark-
able of these have to do with the unequal distribution
of power and its links in the population, and that these
distributions are of scale-free character. It is also sur-
prising to see that power in Chile is highly cohesive, as
denoted by the high degree of transitivity of connections.
On average, more than half of the connections of peo-
ple in the network are also interconnected. Moreover,
the power seems to be “tight-knit”, a real small-world
where at most only a few people (∼ 4) are intermediaries
between any randomly chosen pair of individuals in the
network.
The presence of these properties is very similar to those
observed in complex systems of different natures. For
this reason, their presence can be explained, at least in-
tuitively, as an effect of their growth and adaptation. The
time and the mechanisms associated with these processes
most likely play an important role in their emergence.
The ubiquity (universality) of these complex properties
suggests that there may exist universal principles under-
lying the evolution of systems, irrespective of their origin.
With respect to this underlying principle that may gen-
erate this kind of system structure, our results suggest
that a simple compatibility mechanism between people
in a growing network may engender a social structure
such as the one studied, i.e., strongly inhomogeneous
in its connectivity and power distribution. According
to Taleb [61], this inequality is unexpected for most of
us and would be the reason why it seems to be a non-
intuitive behavior.
According to the CAM, the compatibility of personal
characteristics (see Figs. 10 and 11) seem to be the “key”
for people to belong to a elite group. But, this mecha-
nism is not exclusive to the most powerful group; it op-
erates at all scales, as indicated by the observation of
scaling in the distribution of power P or connectivity.
As a result, there is no single “nucleus of power”; power
concentration exists at all levels, and even the inequality
between powerful people across their distribution is the
same. This coincides with Dahl’s idea of Polyarchy [17],
a government of many that is structured around a sys-
tem of poliar balance. As societies develop, they become
more concrete; this concretion, then, manifests itself po-
litically as an increase in the number of institutions and
leaders (the principle of “dynamic density” of Durkheim
[55]). This leads to a situation of many overlapping in-
stitutions that constantly need to negotiate in order to
achieve their purposes. To resolve any issue that arises,
powerful institutions with their own interests and differ-
ent leaders have to be in agreement.
The concentration of social power in a few seems to
be an emergent property of a dynamical system. This is
not the product of a conspiracy, but the result of unreg-
ulated growth in the social system. However, according
to the model, the distribution of personal characteristics
plays an important role. In fact, as [16] exposes and un-
der assumptions of compatibility, inhomogeneous distri-
butions of personal characteristics could lead to this type
of network, while homogeneous distributions oppose con-
centration. This suggest that more homogeneous popula-
tions could affect, in some way, this risky[73] concentra-
tion of power. This is an important argument in favor of
social reforms that ensure equality and social inclusion.
Another interesting aspects of the proposed model is
that according to Eq. 1, the compatibility should be
more accurate as the population grows. Belonging to the
elite in large populations requires sharing more and more
things. The research of J. Barbier [10] on Chilean elites
between 1755 and 1800 showed that the elite was com-
posed by approximately 347 people, representing 0.04%
of the population at that moment. Moreover, the study
argues that during the last quarter of the 17th century
and the first half of the 18th century, the structure of
the Chilean elite was characterized by strong family ties
(from marriages among the elite) linked to the posses-
sion of titles of nobility. This condition favored the
strong link between power and political control and as-
sociated business, an issue that would continue in the
second half of the 18th century, even though this same
elite gave greater importance to matrimonial relation-
ships with those managers and government administra-
tors through whom enough influence was generated to
favor power and political control.
Today, with a Chilean population over 16 times
greater, belonging to a family of the elite is not enough.
Although our results suggest that family relations are
important as direct links (see Fig. 8), the results also
show that not every person that descended from the elite
has secured power, as was most common in the 18th cen-
tury. There are many examples of people that belong to
the elite without an elitist past. Nowadays, belonging
to a powerful group means to share common interests
(Expected Roles, Positioning, Functions) and values (see
Fig. 10). These commonalities may (or may be not[74])
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have been inculcated during (similar) formations in their
homes or in a few groups of schools and universities (see
results of Fig. 8). Therefore, people could be linked
in various nuclei of power due to the interpretation of
senses and meanings attached to the mutual construc-
tion of symbols, which contain different “senses” linked
to objects of gratification of power and domination, asso-
ciated with preferably expressive and instrumental con-
ducts (see Fig. 11). The results showing that powerful
people link to persons with similar power (see Section
III) dramatically reflect this process, although, as a re-
markable outcome of our analysis, this phenomenon was
shown to occur between less powerful people as well.
The effects of relation by likeness and similarity, ac-
companied by the imitation phenomenon [39, 40], are
the key to understanding the phenomenon of attraction.
Although this was illustrated by W. Mills in his study
of “Power Elite” in the United States [37], it had al-
ready been presented as a caveat by R. Michels in his
“law of the psychological metamorphosis of the leader”.
This law reflects the inevitability that powerful people
end up acting and behaving according to the parameters
of the elite and, indeed, thinking similarly and exhibit-
ing an attitude of conserving positions of power. This is
one possible interpretation from looking at the nucleus
(nuclei) of power.
When we study the two groups of powerful people[75],
businessmen and politicians, more profoundly, the results
show that their “keys of compatibility” are different (see
Fig. 13). This is not at all surprising , since power has
a different meaning for each group, despite the fact that
in both cases we are talking about a power that emerges
from relations, a social capital [1]. Economic power is
projected through trade relations that allow actors ac-
cess to goods, which has an instrumental character to
their purposes [41, 56]. On the other hand, political
power does not refer to possession of goods or instru-
ments, but the ability to control the system of relations.
Political power is the mobilization of all the relational
context as a means. Indeed, our results show that pow-
erful businessmen, mostly engineers or economists, seem
to be dominated by a compatibility based on Expected
Roles (interest), while politicians, mostly lawyers, seem
to be moved by compatibility of Internalized Values (see
Fig. 13). These results would again be explained by
sociological theories of social power. According to M.
Weber [65], power is the imposition of one’s will over an-
other, even against all resistance, and ultimately rests on
the use of force or threat thereof. However, it is much
smarter to ensure prompt and sincere obedience, which
Weber himself appointed “legitimate domination”: The
power required to legitimize aims to capture the belief of
the people, which is where social legitimacy lies. Hence,
politics become a more efficient instrument to build le-
gitimacy, “to convince”. In that sense, there is a greater
ability of politicians to undertake this task than busi-
nessmen (see Fig. 14, upper plot). Unlike the nature
of politics, the economy seems to rest on a principle of
rationality linked to obtaining optimal profits that guide
social actions (supply and demand). In this latter logic,
legitimacy building does not seem a requirement sine qua
non, and thus reduces to some extent efforts to hold onto
the “great narratives” that contain principles and rating
of “political economy”. This difference in constructing
legitimacy sheds some light differences observed between
politicians and businessmen in our work.
Furthermore, businessmen generally seem to follow a
sectoral logic. Their interactions are fundamentally cog-
nitive and are related to expected roles, functions, and
positions. In that sense, the search for power seems to be
more explicit. Politicians, for their part, seem to gener-
ally obey a sectoral logic associated with obtaining con-
trol over processes, planning, and distribution within the
social system. In their search for social legitimacy, their
interactions seem to be related to domination, which is
why their behavior seems to follow value orientations of
social and moral responsibility. However, in both groups,
affect orientations operate transversely and equivalently.
Usually, however, actors do not usually make this kind of
orientation “expressive”. This is one possible explanation
of our analysis, in which the affect orientation appears to
play a less important role (see Figs. 10 and 13).
In light of the results and discussions above, there are
some ideas that want further development. One of these
is related to the Kornhauser’s categories [28]: “accessi-
bility of elites” (how permeable the elites are to the influ-
ence of non-elites) and “availability of non-elites” (how
non-elites are mobilized by elites). The role played by
Chilean society (the non-elite) since 2011 [29, 34, 63],
seems to be the result of a process that has transformed
Chilean society into a more pluralistic one. In such so-
cieties, the accessibility of elites tends to be increasingly
high (high ability to be permeated by non-elite) and the
ability of non-elite to be mobilized (by elites) is increas-
ingly difficult. This makes us notice that linkages of
power also tend to become part of this dynamic.
Finally, and maybe the most remarkable underlying
conclusion of our work, is that power seems to be in
the network, in the connections, in the processes, in the
codes, in the communication, in everything; the concen-
tration (at different scales) that we presented is nothing
more than the “instrumental” organization of power, its
efficient administration with respects to purposes related
to control and maintaining the network itself. A view
in agreement with the observation made recently by Al-
varedo et al. [4] respect to the economic elites. This
represents a different approach to social power in com-
parison with the classic view related to obtaining certain
power that only a few are privy to (“Theory of Elites”).
Power seems to be rather a phenomenon of complex social
systems, part of its substantive properties, not just the
result of petty intentions of mastery of the “few over the
many”, even when these seem to be the “real” expression
that we commonly observe and experience. This opens
an interesting next research that we want to develop in
the future.
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